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Courts in the past have construed away technicalities in the
interest of attaining the practical ends of justice. 7 The courts
today that hold that no appeal lies from a revocation would do better
to re-examine their reasoning. Without an appeal, the humanitarian goals sought to be achieved could very well go unfulfilled.

M
RES IPSA LOQUITUR:

THE EXTENT TO WHICH PLAINTIFF MAY
ESTABLISH NEGLIGENCE

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, while appearing simple on
its face, is one of the more obscure doctrines to be found in the
negligence area. Perhaps the most difficult problem inherent in
this doctrine is, as has been pointed out in the recent New York
appellate division decision of Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc.,
whether or not res ipsa loquitur should be applied where a plaintiff
has proved specific acts of negligence. It is the purpose of this
note to analyze the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in general, with
specific emphasis being placed upon the questions that arise as to
the availability of res ipsa loquitur where a plaintiff has proved
or attempted to prove specific acts of negligence committed by the
defendant.
Res ipsa loquitur has been defined as "a common-sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence,"' 2 or as "a
formulation of a species of circumstantial evidence." 3 The working
definition offered here is that res ipsa loquitur is a procedural device
whereby the plaintiff need not factually establish a prima facie case
of negligence, an inference of negligence being logically deduced
from the neutral circumstantial evidence introduced. The doctrine
was first introduced into Anglo-American law in 1863 in the English
case of Byrne v. Boadle.4 In that case, plaintiff was injured when
he was struck by a barrel of flour which fell from the window of
defendant's store. Even though he failed to factually prove negligence or an intentional tort, plaintiff nevertheless was successful in
his suit.
97

See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964);

Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Rossi,

5 N.Y.2d 396, 157 N.E.2d 859, 185 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1959) and text accompanying notes 47, 58, and 59 supra.
126 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S2d 866 (1st Dep't 1966).
2 Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234, 196 N.E. 36, 38 (1935).
a Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 157, 271
N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (1st Dep't 1966).
4 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863). See Bulman, Res Ipsa LoquiturWhen Does It Apply?, 1961 INs. L.J. 20, 21.
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Test and Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur

The underlying reason for the application of res ipsa loquitur
is that the plaintiff is not in a position to know the facts, i.e., there
are unusual circumstances involved.5 Working logically from this
underlying reason, a test has been developed for the application of
res ipsa loquitur. In order to rely on the doctrine, the plaintiff
must prove (1) that there has been an accident; (2) that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality which caused
the accident both prior to and at the time of the accident, and (3)
that if the defendant were using ordinary care, in the ordinary
course of events the accident would not have happened. 6
The requirement of an accident needs little explanation save to
point out that not only must it be shown that the plaintiff suffered
injury but the instrumentality which caused the injury must be
identified.
The requirement that the defendant must have had exclusive
control of the instrumentality does not mean that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is limited to situations wherein the defendant has
actual physical control but includes those situations where the
defendant has the right of control of the instrumentality.7 In considering this element, one must take into account the case of Ybarra
v. Spangard 8 which is a departure from this concept. There, the
plaintiff sued and recovered for an injury to his shoulder sustained
while he was unconscious during an. operation for appendicitis. The
plaintiff recovered from the doctors and hospital employees connected with the operation, although not all of these defendants
could have had exclusive control of the instrumentality. This case
is truly unique in that neither the instrumentality nor its control
was conclusively established. The decision may be explained by
the defendants' exclusive control of the evidence. That is, ber Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).

6Gerhart v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 425, 132 P.2d
874 (1942).
7For example, where a plaintiff is injured while a passenger in the
defendant's airplane as a result of the plane crashing, the element of

exclusive control is satisfied, the defendant having the exclusive right
of control through his pilot's actual physical control. Citrola v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959). Similarly, where a plaintiff
is injured while shopping in the defendant's supermarket as a result of an
exploding soda bottle, the element of exclusive control is satisfied by the
defendant's exclusive right to supervise or manage the supermarket in
general. Cole v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 44 Misc. 2d 694, 254 N.Y.S.2d
929 (Sup. Ct. 1964). But, where a plaintiff is injured by a chair which
is apparently thrown from a window of defendants hotel, then the defendant-proprietor, not normally having even a right of entry to a guest's

room, does not have the right of control of the instrumentality.
v. St. Francis Hotel, 83 Cal. App. 2d 210, 188 P.2d 513 (1948).
825 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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cause of the peculiar position of a doctor, especially within the
hospital confines, the presumption is so strong that the doctor is
aware of the true facts that exclusive control of the instrumentality
will not be required in this type of situation. In any event, it is
to be noted that no subsequent case has gone as far as the Ybarra
decision and its precedent value may be limited to its unique facts.
The third element of the test for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that the plaintiff must establish that,
if the defendant had used ordinary care, in the ordinary course of
events the accident would not have happened, is a negative concept.
The plaintiff, by his proof, must establish that there was no cause
for the accident other than the negligence of the defendant. 10 By
this, it is not meant that the conclusion of negligence to be reached
by the jury must be made upon "absolute logical certainty," but
the evidence must lead to a conclusion with probable certainty."
"There must be a rational, i.e., evidentiary basis on which the jury
can choose the competing possibilities,"'12 not one of speculation
and conjecture. For example, in Galbraith v. Busch,'" the plaintiff, while a guest in a car operated by one of the defendants, suffered injuries when the automobile suddenly swerved from the
highway and crashed into a tree. The weather was clear, the highway in good condition and little traffic was on the road. Res ipsa
loquitur was held inapplicable even though the instrumentality was
identified and was established to be under the exclusive control of
the defendant. The evidence failed to establish that there was a
greater probability that the accident was caused by the negligence
of the defendant than that 4 it was caused by a mechanical defect
unknown to the defendant.'
9
Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. Rav. 1, 8-9 (1951).
10 Thus, as in an ordinary negligence action, in New York, the plaintiff
must prove the absence of any contributory negligence on his part. Minotti
v. State, 6 App. Div. 2d 990, 176 N.Y.S2d 449 (4th Dep't 1958) (memorandum decision).
11 Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234, 196 N.E. 36, 38 (1935).
12 Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, mipra note 9, at 4.
23 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935).
14The rule of Galbraith has been modified by Pfaffenbach v. White
Plains Exp. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 132, 216 N.E.2d 324, 269 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1966). Here, the plaintiff, a passenger, was injured when the car in which
he was riding was struck by the defendant's truck which had crossed into
the opposite lane. It was raining or snowing and the road was slippery.
The defendant offered no explanation of the accident. There was a verdict
for the plaintiff in the lower court, but the appellate division reversed.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the appellate division, held that the
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of negligence. In reaching

this conclusion, the Court, in dictum, stated:
The nice balance of knowledge and responsibility for some unknown 'defect in the automobile' as a possible cause of an unexplained
accident which the passenger guest, when he got in the car, was
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Once the three elements of the test have been established by
the plaintiff, three effects of the application of the doctrine follow:
(1) there is an inference of culpability on the part of the defendant; (2) the plaintiff's prima facie case is established; and (3) a
question of fact is presented for the defendant to meet with an
explanation.'"
Jurisdictions are divided as to the question of whether the
effect of the doctrine is the creation of a presumption or an inference
of defendant's culpability.'0 A presumption may be defined as
the assumption of the existence of one fact which the law requires
the trier of fact to make on account
of the existence of another fact or
7
group of facts, standing alone.'
In the context of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the purpose of
the presumption is to make the defendant come forth with evidence,
thus shifting the burden of explanation. It is to be noted that the
presumption is rebutted as soon as the defendant comes forth with
any evidence which is contrary to the presumption.'3 If the jurisdiction interprets the presumption of negligence in a strict sense,
then "in absence of evidence to the contrary [submitted by the defendant], the court must decide the issue and direct the jury."'
An inference, on the other hand, is merely a permissible deduction which the jury may make.2 0 Thus, in this context, res ipsa
loquitur is but an evidentiary rule and, therefore, some courts have
taken the position that it neither creates a full presumption nor
entitles the plaintiff to a directed verdict.2 '

This is true even if

deemed to share equally with the owner and driver, and which it was

held to be his burden to eliminate as part of his affirmative case has,
in the 30 years since Galbraith v. Busch was handed down, been sapped
of all practical application to the real world of motor vehicle operation.
...Id. at 135-36, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 116-17.
Indeed, the Court is supported by studies which show that only three
and one-half percent of the cars in accidents have mechanical defects and
only in one-quarter of one percent do these defects play a part. James
& Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. Rnv.
769, 770-71 (1950).
' Plumb v. Richmond Light & R.R., 233 N.Y. 285, 135 N.E. 504 (1922).
Note that although the defendant must come forward with an explanation, the
burden of proof remains with the plaintiff.
10 The majority rule is that res ipsa loquitur creates an inference, not
a presumption. Bulman, Res Ipsa Loquitur-When Does It Apply?, supra
note 7 4. This is the New York position. Infra note 21.
' Note, Some Observations Concerning Premmplions, 44 HARv. L. REv.

906 (1931).

18 Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 II. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930).
"9W. PROSSER, TORTS § 39 (3d ed. 1964).
20 George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455

(1941).

21 Id. See also Dickinson v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 3 App. Div. 2d
629, 158 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't 1956) (memorandum decision); Judd v.
Sams, 270 App. Div. 981, 62 N.Y.S.2d 678 (4th Dep't 1946) (memorandum
decision), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 801, 71 N.E.2d 772 (1947) (memorandum decision).
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the defendant offers no evidence to counter the inference of negli-gence.
In an ordinary negligence action, a plaintiff must establish
that (1) he is an individual or a member of a class of individuals
to which the defendant owes a duty of care, (2) that defendant
has breached that duty, and, (3) that such breach proximately
caused the plaintiff's injuries. In a negligence action in which the
plaintiff has successfully invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the plaintiff must prove all the above facts except that the defendant
was negligent and that negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident.2 3 Instead of actual proof, the inference
of negligence is
24
employed in establishing the prima facie case.
When it is stated that as a result of res ipsa loquitur a question
of fact is presented for the defendant to meet with an explanation,
it is meant that the "burden of explanation" has been shifted25 from
the plaintiff to the defendant, but not the "burden of proof.1

"If

a satisfactory explanation is offered by the defendant, the plaintiff
must rebut it by evidence of negligence or lose his case.1 28 The
underlying reason for this shift is the defendant's exclusive control
over the 27
instrumentality, placing him in a better position to know
the facts.

The more difficult question to be dealt with, if the test for the
application of res ipsa loquitur is met, is whether the doctrine should
still be applied if the plaintiff pleads specific acts of negligence.
Pleading Specific Acts of Negligence
Where a plaintiff has alleged specific acts of negligence the
courts have taken four basic positions: (1) The plaintiff, by his
specific allegations, has waived or lost his right to rely on the
doctrine.2 8 (2) The plaintiff may take advantage of the doctrine
22
Lo Piccolo v. Knight of Rest Prods., Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 369,
183 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 662, 173 N.E2d 51,
212 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961) (memorandum decision).
23 See Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959).
24 The courts have often confused the terms inference and presumption
with each other. With the exception of the previous section, the term
inference as used in this note is not distinguished from the term presumption.
25 It
is to be noted, however, that a few states do shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. E.g., Jacks v. Reeves, 78 Ark. 426, 95 S.W. 781
(1906); Shaughnessy v. Director Gen. of R.Rs., 274 Pa. 413, 118 A.
390 (1922).
26 Plumb v. Richmond Light & R.R., 233 N.Y. 285, 288, 135 N.E. 504
(1922).
27 Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, supra note 9, at 6-9
(1951).
See Whitcher v. Board of Educ., 236 App. Div. 293, 258 N.Y.S. 556 (3d
Dep't
2 1932).
8 E.g., Highland Ave. & B. R. Co. v. South, 112 Ala. 642, 20 So. 1003
(1896); Kerby v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 28 Ili. App. 2d 259, 171 N.E.2d
412 (1960). It should be noted that the court in the Kerby case indicated
that the rule entailed not only allegations of specific acts but also an
attempt to prove such acts.
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if the inference of negligence to be drawn supports the specific
allegations. 29 (3) Res ipsa loquitur may be applied only if the
specific pleading is accompanied by a general allegation of negligence.30 (4) It is available regardless of the form of the pleading. 31
The basic underlying theory of the first three rules is that a
defendant who comes into court with notice only of a specific
claim should not be required to litigate other issues, or to meet inferences based on a theory first advanced at the trial,32 i.e., the
removal of the element of surprise. It should be observed that
today these rules go more to the form than the substance of the
law. In view of the liberal rules applicable to amending complaints
now in use, 33 it would seem unnecessarily restrictive to limit the
plaintiff's proof to his pleadings. Furthermore, should it appear
that allowing the plaintiff to rely on res ipsa loquitur where he alleges specific acts of negligence would cause the element of surprise to be introduced, thus creating an inequity in the proceeding,
the defendant would most likely be able to get a continuance or an
adjournment in order to formulate his defense.3 4 Such an eventuality is, however, unlikely in view of modern pre-trial discovery
techniques, such as the examination before trial. Therefore, the
fourth rule would seem to be the best, i.e., allegations by the plaintiff of specific acts of negligence are of no import as to the application of res ipsa loquitur.35
Specific Proof: The New York Rules
The issue of specific proof has come to be such an enigma
that one New York appellate court, in the case of Zaninovich v.
American Airlines, Inc., 36 stated:
29

E.g., Atkinson v. United R.Rs. of San Francisco, 71 Cal. App. 82,
234 P. 863 (1925) ; Wallace v. Norris, 310 Ky. 424, 220 S.W.2d 967 (1949);
Short
v. D. R. B. Logging Co., 192 Ore. 383, 235 P.2d 340 (1951).
3
0E.g., Rauch v. Des Moines Elec. Co., 206 Iowa 309, 218 N.W. 340
(1928); McDonough v. Boston Elevated Ry., 208 Mass. 436, 94 N.E.
809 (1911); Williams v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 625, 253 S.W.2d

97 31
(1952).

E.g., Johnson v. Greenfield, 210 Ark. 985, 198 S.W.2d 403 (1946);
Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 175 A. 679 (1934); DeRoire
v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 205 App. Div. 549, 199 N.Y.S. 652 (4th Dep't
1923); Caivana v. Spohn, 29 Misc. 2d 183, 217 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct.

1961).

PROSSER, supra note 19, at

§ 40.
FED. R. Civ. P. § 15; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 3025.
E.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. §§4402, 3211(d), (e).
35 For a detailed discussion of the pleading area see Niles, Pleading Res
Ipsa Loquitur, 7 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 415 (1929); Comment, Practice and
Procedure-The Effect of Plaintiff's Pleading on the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 31 MIcH. L. R-v. 817 (1933); Comment, The Effect of Specific
Allegations on the Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 27 FoRDHABi L. REV.
32

W.

33
E.g.,
34

411 (1958).

3626 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st Dep't 1966).
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[I]t has involved grave logical difficulties in trying to separate the type
of case where plaintiff offers less circumstances to establish defendant's
liability from that where he offers more but, still being uncertain of his
ground, declines to elect reliance between the doctrine and his specific
proof.8 7
In that case, the plaintiff-executors were suing on behalf of the
decedents who died when defendant's airplane crashed. The plaintiffs offered evidence showing that the pilot of the airplane was
negligent in his duties and this negligence resulted in the crash.
The lower court, nevertheless, allowed plaintiffs to rely on res
ipsa loquitur.38 The appellate court, in analyzing earlier court
decisions, found there were two rules to be applied. First, "a
plaintiff must elect whether he relies on res ipsa loquitur or proof
of specific cause of accident," 39 and, secondly, a plaintiff may "rely
on the doctrine despite evidence of specific cause of accident so
long as the evidence does not fully account for the accident." 40 The
appellate court concluded that, although the plaintiffs had gone far
enough in their proof so as to bar them from relying on res ipsa
loquitur, the fact that the lower court allowed the plaintiffs to rely
on the doctrine was not prejudicial error since, based on the evidence alone, the jury would have found for the plaintiffs. 4 1
If the plaintiff satisfies the test for res ipsa loquitur and offers
no proof of specific acts of negligence, he may rely on the doctrine.
In addition, as was pointed out in Zaninovich, if the plaintiff meets
the test for res ipsa loquitur and, at the same time, the evidence
submitted by the plaintiff as to the defendant's negligence proves
to be a preponderance of the credible evidence, it apparently makes
no practical difference whether or not plaintiff is allowed to rely
on res ipsa loquitur. However, serious problems remain in the
area where the plaintiff introduces some evidence of specific acts
of negligence which do not equal a preponderance of evidence. The
New York position in this area will be analyzed in an attempt to
clarify and to solve the problems therein.
The first important New York case to be examined is Whitcher
v. Board of Education.42 The plaintiff was a pupil in a school owned
and operated by the defendant. He was injured while leaving the
school building when he was struck on the- head by a piece of glass
8

Id. at 157, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.

38Zanfiifovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 584, 262 N.Y.S2d
854 (Sup. Ct. 1965). For indication of this fact see the appellate division
report, 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st Dep't 1966).
89 26 App. Div. 2d at 157, 271 N.Y.S2d at 869.
40Id. at 158, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
42 Id.

42 233 App. Div. 184, 251 N.Y.S. 611 (3d Dep't 1931).
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which fell from a broken transom. At the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence that the transom had broken as a result of reverberations caused by the slamming of a door which was being blown
around by the wind at the time of the accident. The court indicated
that the duties of the defendant were the care, custody, control and
safekeeping of the school property which involved reasonable inspection and repair, and that there was no proof of neglect in the
performance of these duties. The lower court had given judgment
for the plaintiff allowing him to rely on res ipsa loquitur. The appellate court reversed, finding that the doctrine was inapplicable to
the case. The court stated:
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although it provides a substitute for
direct proof of negligence where plaintiff is unable to point out the
specific act of negligence which caused his injury, is ... to be invoked
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available. . . . Hence the presumption or inference
arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where
act of
the plaintiff has fyuf knowledge and testifies as to the specific
43
negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of.'
Although the court espoused the above doctrine, it would appear that the decision was a misapplication of its own rule. The
plaintiff's evidence established only what was the direct cause of
the accident, i.e., the slamming of the door, but did not establish
whether the defendant's negligence, if it were negligent, was the
proximate cause. To the extent that blueprints, records of inspection and care, and expert opinion might have been available to the
plaintiff, and since the plaintiff had knowledge of the direct cause
of the accident, actual evidence of negligence would have been
available to the plaintiff; a plaintiff in such a case should not be
allowed to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Apparently,
however, judging from the dissenting opinion, such records were
not available to the plaintiff. 4" Thus, the plaintiff in fact did not
have full knowledge of the specific act of negligence and should
have been allowed to rely on res ipsa loquitur.
The anomaly of the Whitcher decision is to be seen in the
court's decision of the case when it was reviewed for the second
time. 45 There, the facts established were identical to those shown
in the first instance except that no evidence was introduced by the
43 Id. at 184-85, 251 N.Y.S. at 612-13 (emphasis added).
It is to be
noted that although the court here attributes the statement to Plumb v.
Richmond Light & R.R., 233 N.Y. 285 (1922), no such statement is to be
found
4 in that case, and all subsequent cases cite Whitcher for the statement.
4 Id. at 186, 251 N.Y.S. at 614 (dissenting opinion).
45
Whitcher v. Board of Educ., 236 App. Div. 293, 258 N.Y.S. 556 (3d
Dep't 1932).
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plaintiff tending to establish that the glass fell because of the slamming of the door. The lower court refused to allow the plaintiff
to rely on res ipsa loquitur, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff should have been allowed to rely upon the
doctrine because the defendant was "in the best position to show
that the happening was without its fault."4 6
The -result of the Whitcher case was the formation of three
conflicting rules of election in New York. They are: (1) if the
plaintiff has offered evidence in some degree to explain the direct
cause of the accident he is barred from relying on res ipsa loquitur;
(2) where the plaintiff introduces evidence which tends to establish specific acts of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff is barred
from relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; and, (3) the
plaintiff is barred from relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
only where he factually establishes a prima facie case.
The first rule is apparently based on the actual result of the
Whitcher cases. The second rule is apparently based in part on
the reasoning given in those cases. The third is apparently based
in total on the reasoning found in Whitcher.
An example of the first rule is found in Bressler v. New York
Rapid Transit Corp.,47 wherein the plaintiff was injured when
struck by a piece of glass which fell from the window of the defendant's train on which she was a passenger. The plaintiff
claimed that the window was cracked prior to falling, but stated
that the defendant could not be charged with notice or negligence
based on that fact alone. Similarly, the defendant was not charged
with negligence in the operation of the train with respect to any
sudden jolting or jerking. The defendant offered evidence tending
to show that a boy had thrown a stone through the window, thus
causing the accident. The lower court submitted the case to the jury
on the basis of res ipsa loquitur and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
The. Court of Appeals reversed, holding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable to the case.
The Court found that the plaintiff's evidence tended to prove
the cause of the accident but did not establish evidence of 'the defendant's negligence. While approving the Whitcher decisions, the
Court stated "[i]n the absence of evidence by plaintiff tending in
some degree to explain the cause of . . . [the] accident,"4 s the defendant would have the "burden of explanation." Thus, since the
plaintiff had offered evidence in some degree to explain the direct
cause of the accident, he was barred from relying on res ipsa
loquitur. It would seem that the Court's reasoning here cannot be
logically supported. Res ipsa loquitur allows an inference or pre46

Id. at 294, 258 N.Y.S. at 557.

4 270 N.Y. 409, 1 N.E.2d 828 (1936).
48

Id. at 413, 1 N.E.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
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sumption of negligence where negligence cannot be proved, not
where the direct cause of the injury cannot be established. The
Court failed to distinguish between the direct and the proximate
cause of the injury, i.e., although the falling glass can be considered
the direct cause of injury, no evidence was introduced on behalf of
the plaintiff tending to establish the negligence of the defendant
as the proximate cause of the glass falling.49
The second rule of election in New York may be illustrated
by two cases: Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc.50 and Cunningham v. Lence Lanes, Inc.5 1 Goodheart was a wrongful death action
which evolved when plaintiff's intestate died as a passenger on the
defendant's airplane when it crashed. The plaintiff alleged that the
pilot was negligent in that, among other things, he carelessly and
unnecessarily deviated from the safe course he was ordered to take
and took a course over an unfamiliar mountainous area thereby
proceeding at an unsafe altitude. The plaintiff's proof tended to
establish the specific indications of negligence: that the plane
crashed into the mountain twelve hundred feet below its summit;
that the mountain was located fifty miles off the route which the
pilot had been ordered to take; that the pilot had maps showing
the contour of the land over which he flew; and, that although the
weather was inclement, the airplane was equipped with all the
necessary instruments for "flying blind." The defendant proved
that it had complied with all government rules and regulations,
that the pilot was experienced and licensed and that the plane and
instruments were sound and had been inspected prior to the flight.
Although the plaintiff did not request the court to do so, the
lower court submitted the case to the jury on the theory of res
ipsa loquitur and the jury gave a verdict for the defendant. The
appellate division, on the plaintiff's appeal, reversed, finding that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable in that the plaintiff introduced evidence to establish the specific acts of negligence
2
and the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence.>
It appears that the court, by linking the allegations of negligence with the proof, erred in its analysis. Based on the facts presented in this case, it would seem to be a proper one for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. All the facts proved
by the plaintiff appear to be neutral and circumstantial in nature.
Therefore, since the plaintiff had merely alleged and not formally
proved any actual facts which showed negligence, a combination of
the two should not be sufficient to withhold the benefit of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.
49 From a reading of subsequent cases, it would appear that the rule of
this case has not been followed.
50252 App. Div. 660, 1 N.Y.S.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1937).
0125 App. Div. 2d 238, 268 N.Y.S.2d 609 (3d Dep't 1966).
52252 App. Div. at 663, 1 N.Y.S2d at 291.
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In Cunningham, the plaintiff, a business invitee of defendant,
was injured while leaving the defendant's bowling establishment
by means of a glass door. When he opened the door in an apparently proper manner, the plate glass in the door shattered and
fell from its frame, striking plaintiff on the leg and causing his
injury. At the trial, plaintiff introduced direct evidence tending to
prove that the glass shattered because of the defendant's specific
acts of negligence in the construction, maintenance and supervision
of the door. The lower court submitted the case to the jury with
an instruction as to the applicability of res ipsa loquitur and judgment was given for the plaintiff. The appellate court, in reversing,
held that not only was the proof submitted insufficient to establish
negligence but it "effectively deprived the plaintiff of the benefit
of the presumption under the rule of res ipsa loquitur." 53
Thus, the second rule of election as to res ipsa loquitur of the
New York courts is that where the plaintiff introduces evidence
which tends to establish specific acts of defendant's negligence, he
is barred from relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loauitur. The
purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur being to allow a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case via an inference that the defendant was negligent and that such negligence had caused the
plaintiff's injury, it is hard to see why proof of specific acts of
negligence should deny the plaintiff this inference where, because
of the surrounding circumstances, he is unable to gain full knowledge
of the accident. Indeed, there is every reason to allow the plaintiff
the inference of the defendant's negligence in such circumstances.
For example, assume the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's train and that the train crashed, injuring the plaintiff. The
plaintiff proves that the defendant's engineer was drunk and acting
in a careless manner, but he cannot show that this was the proximate cause of the accident. In fact, unknown to the plaintiff, but
known to the defendant, the accident was caused by the defendant's
switchman negligently leaving a switch open. This fact is not
offered at trial, nor could the plaintiff ever discover such fact. It
is submitted that under these circumstances, the plaintiff should
not be denied the inference of res ipsa loquitur even though it is
proved that such alleged negligence was not the cause of the accident.
The third rule barring a plaintiff from relying on res ipsa
loquitur has developed in recent years in the federal courts which
have interpreted New York law. In the case of Citrola v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc.,54 the plaintiff was the administratrix of an individual killed in an airplane crash. The plaintiff showed that im53 25 App. Div. 2d at 239, 268 N.Y.S2d at 610.
54264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959);
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mediately prior to the accident the defendant's plane was flying
below the minimum altitude allowed by regulations. This evidence
alone, if believed by the jury, would have been sufficient to prove
negligence. In the district court, the case went to the jury on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and judgment was given for the plaintiff. The circuit court of appeals, in affirming the judgment, noted
that flying below the minimum altitude was only one possible cause
for the accident, that several other probable negligent causes also
existed, and, therefore, the inference of res ipsa loquitur was allowed. The court stated:
The strength or weakness of the inference will, of course, vary with
the circumstances. If the plaintiff introduces evidence tending to prove
a specific cause of the occurrence, naturally the strength of the possible
inference that the occurrence was attributable to an unknown act of
the defendant diminishes. 55
This view was further confirmed in Becker v. American Airlines, hc.,56 which involved a hearing to determine the rule on a
pre-trial question as to the application of res ipsa loquitur. The
court ruled that the plaintiff's right to rely on the doctrine was
"not lost by plaintiff's attempt to show the possible causes of an
57
airplane accident."
Thus, the federal interpretation of New York law seems to
be that where there is some evidence introduced tending to show
specific acts of the defendant's negligence, but not purporting to
furnish a complete explanation of the accident, such introduction
does not destroy the inferences consistent with the evidence or
deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of res ipsa loquitur.58 Where
the evidence furnishes a complete explanation of the accident, there
obviously can be no inference of negligence since the plaintiff would
then have proved a prima facie case under the ordinary rules of
negligence.
A fourth theory has been suggested that only evidence of
specific negligence which "clearly establishes the precise cause of
the injury" and not "[e]vidence of specific negligence which
amounts to a prima facie case" should rule out the possibility of a
plaintiff's utilization of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 9 How55 Id.at 818.

U8200 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
571d. at 840 (emphasis added).
58 This is the rule suggested in W. PRossER, ToRTs § 40
Although not truly adopting the federal interpretation in
New York appellate court has incorporated the language
interpretation into its opinion. McKenna v. Allied Chem.
8 App.
Div. 2d 463, 188 N.Y.S2d 919 (4th Dep't 1959).
59

(3d ed. 1964).
its decision, a
of the federal
& Dye Corp.,

Note, Negligence-Res Ipsa Loqultur-Applicability, 1959 Wis. L. Rv.

325, 328.
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ever, it is suggested that the proponent of such a rule has fallen
into a semantic trap since both phrases appear mutually inclusive.
Under normal principles of negligence a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant's act of negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury. Therefore, evidence of specific negligence which clearly
establishes the precise cause of the injury is a necessary and integral
part of a negligence action wherein res ipsa loquitur is not applicable.
Conclusion
Of the three New York rules pronounced in the courts, the
federal interpretation seems to be the most reasonable. The rule
that a plaintiff will be barred from relying on res ipsa loquitur
when he proves the direct cause of the injury is deficient in that
it fails to take into account the fact that the negligence of a defendant is not necessarily the direct cause of the accident.
The rule that a plaintiff will be barred from relying on the
doctrine where his proof tends to establish specific acts of negligence is also open to criticism. The rule fails to take into account
the fact that a res ipsa loquitur inference creates a prima facie case,
i.e., the inference is that the defendant was negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The negligence
which the plaintiff tends to establish through his proof is not necessarily the proximate cause of the accident, and he should therefore
not be denied the inference under certain circumstances.
On the other hand, the federal interpretation that the plaintiff
will be barred from relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only
where he establishes a prima facie case seems to be the most
equitable rule.60 Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals seems
to be favoring the federal interpretation, 6 1as may be seen in the
recent case of McDonald v. Shell Oil Co.
In McDonald, the plaintiff's intestate was killed when he was
struck by a piece of chain while waiting for his automobile at a
service station. The station was owned by the defendant Shell Oil
Company and leased to and operated by the defendant Smith. Smith
had requested Shell to install an hydraulic lift in one of its bays,
the other bay already having a lift. Shell purchased the equipment
from the defendant Joyce Cridland Company and hired the defendant Manion to install it. Manion connected the control valve for
the new lift. While he was doing this he had turned off the
compressor and had asked Smith not to turn it on or to use the
old lift while he was working. Accordingly, Smith's employees
60 Under the federal interpretation, the introduction of evidence tending
to establish specific acts of negligence goes only to the strength of the
inference. '
6120 N.Y.2d 160, 288 N.E.2d 899, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1967).
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waited until Manion had finished for the day and then turned on
the compressor to use the old lift. The control valve was turned
off for the new lift, but, as a result of a leak in the valve, air
flowed into the new lift causing it to rise. The chain holding the
lift in place broke and the accident resulted.
The leak in the valve was caused by a sliver of low carbon
steel. The valve itself was made of stainless steel but the pipes
to which the valve had been attached were made of low carbon
steel. At the trial, the defendant Manion testified that prior to
attaching the pipes he had cut them and this produced metallic
shavings.
The lower court found in favor of the defendants Shell Oil
Company and Joyce Cridland Company, but found for the plaintiff
as against Smith and Manion. The Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment as to Smith but affirmed as to Manion. In its opinion
the Court noted that "[t]he plaintiff did not rely on res ipsa loquitur
but attempted to show specific acts of negligence" ;62 nevertheless,
the Court felt that
[t]he sliver had to come from somewhere. Since it was not of the
same substance (stainless steel) as the valve, there appears a sufficient
basis for inferring that Manion caused it.63

The question to be answered is on what theory did the Court
rely in affirming the judgment against Manion. The Court plausibly could have reached its decision on the basis of damaging circumstantial evidence of negligence. However, it would seem that
if the Court followed this theory it would have announced its
rationale as such. Moreover, if this was the Court's theory, there
was no need to mention the res ipsa loquitur doctrine at all.
On the other hand, the Court could have relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to affirm the judgment. If it did so, it
must be determined whether the Court deemed the evidence submitted entirely neutral and circumstantial or in part tending to establish specific acts of negligence. It would seem, by the Court's
reliance on Manion's damaging testimony, that it believed that
the evidence tended to establish a specific act of negligence. Since
the Court affirmed the judgment, if it was indeed basing its opinion
on res ipsa loquitur, there is no conclusion to be had other than
that the Court of Appeals followed the federal interpretation as to
proof of negligence.
To reiterate, the federal interpretation is that, as long as the
plaintiff does not establish a prima facie case, the fact that the
at 165, 288 N.E.2d at 901, 281 N.Y.S2d at 1004.
63Id. at 166, 288 N.E.2d at 902, 281 N.Y.S2d at 1006 (emphasis
62 Id.

added).
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proof offered tends to establish a specific act of negligence should
not bar the plaintiff from relying on res ipsa loquitur. It is submitted that the federal interpretation is the proper one with one
further limitation. In a situation where the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case, but from all the evidence submitted
it is reasonable to assume he could have done so, the plaintiff
should not be allowed to hide behind the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; he should not be given the procedural advantage of an inference
to which he is not equitably entitled.

